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Abstract
This paper seeks to portray and examine the dominant understanding of terror-
ism as reﬂected in ofﬁcial discourse in Singapore. It also evaluates its impact on 
attempts aimed at combating terrorism's potent threat to social cohesion. It is 
maintained that pervasive inﬂuence of the culturalist approach woven into the 
understanding of terrorism has had the effect of thrusting into focus Islam and 
certain presumptions of the identity and culture of the Muslim community of Sin-
gapore. The dominance of this approach conditions and compounds the lack of a 
more comprehensive and objective analysis of the phenomenon informed by con-
cepts and methodology from the social sciences. This impedes efforts at fostering 
social resilience and cohesion aimed at thwarting the looming threat of terrorism. 
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Introduction
In Singapore, ofﬁcial discourse on the 9/11 tragedy and the 'war on terror' 
thrust into focus once again the problem of social cohesion (Singapore 
Ministry of Home Affairs 2003: 23). With its ethnically plural society com-
prising a Chinese majority (about 76 percent), a substantial minority of 
Malay/Muslims (about 15 percent) and a smaller percentage of Indians 
and others, social cohesion has been a major political concern since Singa-
pore's inception in 1965. This paper seeks to examine how the problem is 
managed in the context of post-9/11. It contends that the understanding 
of terrorism reveals the persistence of the dominance of the culturalist 
perspective, which has the effect of focusing on Islam as the crux of the 
issue. This not only impedes a more comprehensive understanding of 
terrorism but may undermine the very efforts at fostering cohesion. 
From the outset since 9/11, Singapore's political elite has publicly 
declared that the war on terror is not a war against Islam nor is the 
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Muslim community in Singapore in any way associated with the per-
petrators of the tragedy who have called for a global holy war. Such 
declarations were important to defuse the rising contempt for Muslims 
by a section of non-Muslims in Singapore as the backlash of inter-com-
munal hatred could cause serious disruption to national cohesion, as 
Singapore prepares to support the United States' initiatives against Iraq, 
Afghanistan and the Al-Qaeda terrorist network. Thus, shortly after 
the 9/11 attack, Goh Chok Tong, then prime minister, issued a stern 
warning to this effect:  
We do not want Singapore to be polarized along racial and religious lines. All 
communities…must see the conﬂict for what it is—a war against a common 
enemy, terrorism, and not one against Islam. We must not equate Islam with 
the terrorist acts of Muslims who perpetrate them. We will deal seriously 
with anyone who tries to exploit the current situation to inﬂame relations 
between racial and religious groups.1
Similarly, Lee Kuan Yew declared: 'It is necessary to emphasize that 
the war against terrorism is not a war against Islam. The majority of 
Muslims have nothing to do with terrorism or extremism.'2
Yet, the perception that Islam is inextricably intertwined with the 
problem recurred. Speeches expressed concern with what has gone 
wrong with Islam as political leaders delved into theological conﬂicts in 
the history of Muslim societies3 and pointed out that  'militant terrorist 
groups have hijacked Islam as their driving force and have given it a 
virulent twist' as they set out 'to impose their version of Islam.'4 Lee's 
assertion that underlying the problem of radicalism is the battle for the 
soul of Islam reinforced this view:
We have as neighbours over 200 million Muslims in Indonesia and some 15 
million in Malaysia. At ﬁrst sight, this is a struggle between extremist radicals 
in the Muslim world on one side and America, Israel and their western allies 
on the other. But look deeper and you will see that at its heart, it is a struggle 
about what Islam means between the extremist Muslims and the rationalist 
Muslims, between fundamentalist Muslims and modernist Muslims (Straits 
Times 20 February 2003: 17). 
Although Lee alluded to the rise of terrorism in the context of the cold 
war, this angle was not consistently pursued in ofﬁcial discourse.   
That religion is the issue is also implied in Foreign Minister George 
Yeo's comments: 
The interaction between Islam and Christianity over the centuries has been a 
troubled and difﬁcult one. Memories of the crusades still run deep. Terrorism 
has complicated matters further. September 11 forced religious leaders on 
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both sides to look hard at each other's positions wondering whether any 
reconciliation is possible. In Singapore, September 11 and the discovery of 
JI network encouraged Muslim and Christian leaders to reach out to each 
other (Straits Times 18 March 2008: 20).
Dominance of the Culturalist Approach
While at one level of the discourse, Islam is removed from the problem 
of terrorism, at another, it is woven into it. This inconsistency manifests 
the prevalent inﬂuence of the culturalist approach in analyzing issues 
involving Muslims in general, reinforced by 9/11. Characterized by a style 
of thought in which perspectives and methodology of the social sciences 
utilized in understanding culture and society are largely neglected, this 
approach is not anti-culture as such, but shores up an essentialized one. 
In this perspective, Islam constitutes the single major force that shapes 
Muslims' sentiments, attitudes, values and orientations, relationships with 
Muslims and non-Muslims and perceptions on a myriad of issues, as it is 
deemed  'a discrete entity, a coherent and closed set of beliefs, values and 
anthropological patterns embodied in a common society, history and ter-
ritory' (Roy 2004: 9). Being an 'exploratory concept for almost everything 
involving Muslims', Islam is reductively ascribed as the main motive 
that conditions Muslims' thought and action in ways that are common 
and predictable. It is also the factor accorded overriding signiﬁcance in 
explaining their problems and drawbacks (Roy 2004: 9-17).5         
This approach is also manifested by an imagination of the ummah 
(unity of believers of the same faith) as an exclusive group, distinguished 
from others in terms of worldview, attitudes, beliefs, sense of values 
shared more in common by them than with non-Muslims and which 
condition judgment pertaining to matters affecting their own kind.  Dif-
ferences and alignment within the ummah are attributed to variation of 
theological leanings regardless of the innumerable diversity of group 
thought, ideological interests, traditions, politics, history and cultures 
of the Muslims. 
A number of factors, some external to Singapore, condition its preva-
lence, including the use of Islam to justify terrorism, the focus on conﬂicts 
involving Muslims, the constant confusion between Islam as a religion 
and Muslim culture and the 'compelling need for instant analysis' by 
observers, politicians and the public (Roy 2004: 9-17).6 Equally perti-
nent is the inundation of publications that make Islam the issue, such 
as Islam and violence, Islam and terrorism, the Islamist menace as well 
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as apologetic denials of these.7 Compounding these is the ideologically 
motivated rhetoric Mamdani characterized as 'Culture Talk' (Mamdani 
2004: 17-62). Unlike culture studied by anthropologists (face-to-face, 
local and intimate), this comes in ready-made geo-political packages 
used as the basis to explain those in favour of a peaceful, civic existence 
and those inclined to terror. 
The geo-politics of the region are no less pertinent. Historically, Is-
lam has been the potent force that mobilized Malay/Muslims against 
the governing elite in the context of colonialism necessitating colonial 
governments to contain its inﬂuence.8 Singapore's model of multicul-
turalism premised on race, which forms the primary means of social 
classiﬁcation and basis of signiﬁcant policies, also tends to downplay 
heterogeneity within ethnic groups and commonalities between them 
(Clammer 1998: 173).9 Its predominantly Chinese population in the midst 
of a Muslim majority region and fear of potential divided loyalty of its 
Malay/Muslims in the face of aggression by its neighbours may also 
compound the prevalence of the perspective.10 Being the only Chinese 
majority state with two neighbours with entrenched communal politics 
vis-a-vis their more economically dominant Chinese minority makes 
it even more vulnerable to this approach in its ideology of survival. 
Although the state does not adopt a communal economic policy as in 
Malaysia, the perspective conditions its management of ethnic relations 
and political representation. Furthermore, its strong alliance with the 
US and Israel, and being the only country in the region that supported 
the US invasion of Iraq, could have induced fear of vulnerability to 
terrorists' reprisals impacting the need to balance its foreign policy 
with ethnic relations management. These could have been reinforced 
by projections of Muslims in the region as 'potentially sympathetic' to 
terrorist networks (Ramakrishna 2002: 5). 
The issue with the culturalist approach is not in its assumption that 
Muslims share concern for one another when it involves problems af-
fecting their own kind, for such sentiments are not unique to them. Its 
major limitation is its presumption that this common religious bond can 
override other considerations and impair objectivity when it concerns 
matters affecting them. The approach existed long before 9/11 and the 
Bali bombings but is reinforced after these tragic events. For instance, it 
is manifested in the basis underlying Muslims' appointments to strategic 
positions in national security.  As Lee in a dialogue with community 
leaders explicated,
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These are realities we have to weigh when deploying anyone to a sensitive 
appointment in the Singapore Armed Forces. We must never put the person 
in a situation where he may face a conﬂict of loyalties. …it is a difﬁcult 
matter to put a Malay Muslim of deeply religious family background in 
charge of a machine gun. We should never have to ask this of anyone…in 
the security services, because of our context, we cannot ignore race and 
religion in deciding suitability.11
Such a perception, which strongly implies that should Singapore be 
attacked by a Muslim aggressor, Malays' loyalty may not be vouched 
for, reveals the strong presumption of the reiﬁed ummah. That Muslims 
would presumably face a dilemma merely because the aggressor is an-
other Muslim, irrespective of any other consideration or object of war, 
downplays or negates variations and conﬂicts in values, thought, moral-
ity or ideological interests that are generally assumed of any society. 
September 11 reinforced the dominance of the culturalist approach ev-
ident in ofﬁcial discourse highlighting Singaporean Muslims' sentiments 
on the war against terror. Though acknowledging Muslims' support for 
the government's stand on the war, speeches reiterated the problem of 
the ummah on social cohesion and warned of its growing strength with 
global communications and oil wealth from Saudi Arabia.12 Muslims 
are repeatedly singled out and advised not to be taken in by terrorists 
that portray the US as being against Islam. As Goh asserted,
We are a multi-racial, multi-religious society and Singaporeans may not 
all react in the same way to the same events. It is important…that we get 
across the message that we support the US because it is ﬁghting terrorism. 
Unfortunately, innocent Afghans are caught in the cross fire, and we 
sympathize with them. That is why we are extending humanitarian aid to 
Afghanistan. We must expect Osama, the Taliban and their followers to 
portray the US as being against Islam and attacking a Muslim country. They 
have called all Muslims to start a jihad against the US. I am comforted that 
our Muslims understand the issues and are not confused by the call.13
His reference to the notion of the 'clash of civilizations', which draws 
its source from Huntington's thesis (1996), is yet another manifestation 
of the prevalent perspective. Itself a symptom of the approach, the the-
sis is premised on a deep binary between two camps, Muslims and the 
Western Other, characterized by conﬂicts and clashes:
Osama's tactic is to turn the US war against terrorism into a war seen by 
Muslims as against Muslims. If he succeeds, he would have divided the 
world into Islamic and non-Islamic camps, and brought about a clash of 
civilizations. I do not think he will succeed because the Americans have 
been careful not to fall into his trap. Nevertheless, Osama's message strikes 
a chord amongst many Muslims, even moderate ones, because of deep 
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seated historic reasons and the strength of Muslim brotherhood. Hence, it 
is understandable why Singaporean Muslims feel strong sympathy for the 
fate of the Afghan civilians who are at risk of a humanitarian disaster.14
It is this perspective that prompts Goh to doubt a RAND Corporation 
study differentiating groups of Muslims. Though he admits its useful-
ness as a starting point, he asserts that it overstates differences within 
the global Muslim community and oversimpliﬁes the problem by failing 
to recognize what all Muslims share in common.15
It is the dominance of the culturalist perspective that even allows 
room for pontiﬁcating that Muslims may sympathize with those who 
support or perpetrate terrorism. That Huntington's thesis surfaced in 
ofﬁcial local discourse despite it having been vehemently criticized, 
highlights its prevalence in understanding Muslims. Said (2001), for 
instance, had noted that the thesis overlooks internal dynamics and 
the plurality of civilizations and misses the fact that the major contest 
in most modern cultures concerns the deﬁnition or interpretation of 
each culture. The perspective also reduces identities to isolated entities 
devoid of the inﬂuence of human history, which has contained not only 
wars and conquests but also facilitated exchange, cross-fertilization 
and sharing.  
Fear of the 'Ummah'
The fear of Muslims' potential sympathy for terrorists who would exploit 
fellow Muslims using a common religion reveals the dominance of the 
culturalist approach. Furthermore, focusing on Muslims as potential 
opponents of the war implies that non-Muslims are advocates of the 
war effort or are at least agreeable to it. While Muslims may well feel for 
their fellow Muslims threatened by the perils of war, their sentiments 
are also shaped by a myriad of considerations and principles that are 
not exclusive to them as Muslims, of which the cost to innocent human 
lives is not the least signiﬁcant. From the outset, voices of dissent have 
proliferated on why war is deemed not the best course for punishment 
in spite of 9/11; these cut across religious and ethnic lines including 
factions within the American public itself and the United Nations. 
However, the overriding signiﬁcance accorded to the ummah clouds 
the possibility of conceiving that Singaporean Muslims' thinking and 
sentiments on this issue are not necessarily homogenous or determined 
by ties of common faith in isolated, static, exclusive conditions. On the 
contrary, like others, including Singaporeans, their sentiments may well 
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be shaped by interaction with ideas produced and circulating in this 
shrinking global world. By locating the dilemma as one confronting the 
Muslim community per se, the culturalist approach assumes difference 
based on religion, which may impair a more accurate understanding of 
the sentiments of Singaporeans as well as diversity within the Muslim 
community itself.  
Muslim's Religiosity and Religious Institutions
The focus on Islam has also renewed apprehension for Muslims' religios-
ity and religious institutions fostering social cohesion, which had been 
highlighted prior to 9/11. Muslims' involvement in mosques rather than 
in national organizations and some of their religious practices such as 
dietary restrictions were issues that have raised concerns bearing on 
integration. After 9/11, Goh had commented that while most Muslims 
in Singapore are moderate, open-minded and inclusive, there are some 
who have become rigid in the practice of their religion, such as those 
who insisted on headscarves in schools for girls and who preferred to 
eat separately from non-Muslims. He raised concern over the possibility 
that the increasingly narrow and rigid interpretation of their religion 
would discourage critical thinking and open them to exploitation by 
radical clerics, which happened to many members of the JI who are 
believed to have been indoctrinated into believing that taking part in a 
jihad could alone atone for their sins.16
The apprehension is also reﬂected in Lee's assertion that though his 
original concern was over the growing separateness of the Muslim com-
munity, which tended to centre its social activities in mosques instead 
of in multiracial community clubs, what came as a shock was that this 
heightened religiosity facilitated Muslim terror groups linked to Al-
Qaeda to recruit Singaporean Muslims into their network.17 He opined 
that the increase in religiosity worldwide has
geared up whole populations and then some of those in a high pitch are 
hijacked by the extremist radicals to become jihadists. Al-Qaeda and their 
local extremists recruit from the mosques those who look suitable for their 
own religious classes, where they are taught that it is the duty of all good 
Muslims to ﬁght for all oppressed Muslims worldwide and, if necessary, 
to die for the cause, to become syahids (martyrs) (Straits Times 30 December 
2002: 30). 
Such apprehension may well have been conditioned by the spot-
light on radical preachers such as Abu Hamza Al-Masri, of Finsbury 
116 ___________________ The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 27(2)•2009
Noor Aisha Abdul Rahman __________________________________________________
Park Mosque in London, and others in Pakistan and Indonesia who 
used mosques and religious schools to preach radical ideas and obtain 
recruits. They provide fodder for the image of these institutions as 
conveyor belts for the radicalization of young people. However, such 
thinking leaves many important questions unanswered. For instance, it 
cannot explain how demanding the right to put on the tudung (headscarf) 
and eating separately from non-Muslims translates into violence, killing 
and terrorism or makes one participate in atrocities that involve taking 
away innocent lives. Nor can it explain why fundamentalist Muslims 
who insist that only their interpretation on various issues is right, never 
turn to violence that sanctions the killing of innocent people. Further-
more, research systematically examining factors generating recruitment 
have also dispelled these images and cautioned against overgenerali-
zations. Not only are these mosques or madrasah found to be very few 
in number, their connection with violence and terrorism is tempered 
by a collusion of factors that has been overlooked or missed (Sageman 
2004). In many instances those involved in these atrocities were neither 
afﬁliated with religious institutions nor were they religious in terms of 
their observance of Islam (Roy 2004: 309-10). More importantly, in most 
of these cases mosques were meeting places but not themselves radical 
in terms of the teachings and activities they propagated.
As Islam and Muslim religiosity are accorded focus conditioned by 
the culturalist approach, the battle, it is asserted, must be undertaken 
by the Muslims themselves. Thus Goh declared: 
This ideological struggle is far more complex than the struggle against 
communism because it engages not just reason but religious faith. You and 
I as non-Muslims have no locus standi to engage in this struggle for the soul 
of Islam. It is a matter for Muslims to settle among themselves.18 
In this respect, an oft-cited authority is Gunaratna who maintains that 
while Al-Qaeda can be tackled militarily, it is only by challenging the 
Islamists' misinterpretation and misrepresentation of the Koran that the 
international community can inﬂict long-term strategic damage on the 
group. As such, an integral part of the strategy against Al-Qaeda should 
include exposing its heretical nature (Straits Times 15 October 2002: 13).  
'Moderates' and 'Extremists'
Despite its complexity and diversity, the Muslim community, by virtue of 
the operation of the culturalist paradigm, is divided into two overarching 
entities, namely, the moderates and the extremists. The term 'moderates' 
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is malleable and has been used with different meanings including being 
less religious (Straits Times 26 August 2002: 11). It has also been utilized 
to refer to those who 'believe in the modern world and are part of the IT 
civilization' as opposed to the extremists who by implication reject these 
(Straits Times 3 December 2004: 10). Yet, such a notion contradicts the 
proﬁle of many terrorists who, like the second generation of Al Qaeda 
militants, have been found to have emerged disproportionately from 
modern, secular education and institutions of learning.19 
Stemming from the culturalist approach, these two categories are 
pitted against one another. In particular, the 'moderates' are expected 
to take the lead and counter the 'extremists' who promote violence and 
radicalism. As Lee maintains,
Governments can beef up their intelligence services, ferret out and destroy 
terrorist networks … but only the Muslims themselves, those with moderate, 
more modern approach to life –can ﬁght the fundamentalists for control of 
the Muslim soul. Muslims must counter the terrorist ideology that is based 
on a perverted interpretation of Islam' (Straits Times 7 October 2003: 18).
The framing of the problem as a matter of religion, which places the 
onus on the 'moderates' to resolve, is part of a wider discourse that has 
been traced to Bernard Lewis who believed that there are other groups 
(apart from the fundamentalists) and had warned of a hard struggle 
between them, which the west can do little or nothing about. It must 
remain a bystander while Muslims ﬁght their internal war, pitting good 
against bad Muslims (Mamdani 2004 : 22-23).   
That the 'moderates' themselves have had the task thrust upon them 
of having to ﬁght their own misguided kind or otherwise suffer the 
consequence of remaining silent is reﬂected in Goh's counsel: 'If you do 
not isolate these groups, you leave them alone, the fringe groups will 
become bolder and bolder and they become more and more radical in 
their views. And then the non-Muslims will come to the conclusion that 
Muslims are like that, when it is not true.' The Muslim community is 
thus urged to establish some kind of 'self policing' mechanism to identify 
deviant groups, 'people who might be prone to terrorism' (Straits Times 
1 February 2002: 11). 
Warnings of a backlash to the silent 'moderates' who would be vic-
timized, not only by the radicals but hate crimes by non-Muslims, also 
surfaced in Lee's statements: 
But the crux of the battle really, the core battle, is between moderate and 
extreme Muslims. At the moment, the moderate Muslims are keeping out of 
sight. But if Madrid, 9/11, Bali and so on keep going on and the moderates in 
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the Muslim world keep silent, either condone or duck the issue, then there is 
a danger that the West may begin to feel, that really, there are no champions 
to counter these terrorists. ... That would become a very dangerous problem' 
(Straits Times 27 March 2004: H 2).
The culturalist perspective again surfaces in the reasons articulated 
for the perceived lack of support by the 'moderates' to speak up:
When we ask why it is that moderates in such a spectrum do not raise their 
voices to challenge extremists, we must acknowledge that one reason is that 
on so many issues they share much in common even when they disagree 
on particulars.… We know we should work with the moderates and isolate 
the extremists. But as we seek to separate the wheat from the chaff, we need 
to recognize that both come from the same plant. How we seek to engage 
and encourage the Muslim world to ﬁght the ideological battle against the 
extremists must reﬂect this sensitivity and awareness. This is complicated 
but not impossible.20
Such statements imply that Muslims are restrained in condemning 
extremism from within their own society due in part to their common 
faith. Yet Muslims' historical consciousness and vehemence against im-
morality and bankruptcy of extremism occurred very early on in history. 
Alatas, for instance, traced evidence of terrorism to the hideous activities 
of the Khawarij during the reign of the Caliph Ali in the seventh century 
who resorted to terror against Muslims and created extreme fear and 
insecurity, which the Muslims struggled against (Utusan Melayu 23 May 
2002). The common faith did not create a sense of ambivalence towards 
horrendous acts of violence perpetrated by those of the same faith. In 
the same spirit, innumerable Muslims across the globe have utterly 
condemned terrorism that has resulted in the sacriﬁce not only of the 
lives of innocent non-Muslims but Muslims themselves.  
Thrusting the challenge onto the Muslim community does not mean 
that the government is washing its hands of the problem and it has 
certainly not. However, it has to some extent facilitated treating the 
community as a kind of interest association, charged with the duty of 
looking after the requirements of its own deﬁned members (Brown 1993: 
26).21 Muslims are also urged to make the religion understood by the 
non-Muslim majority, which many have responded to.  
Muslim Elite's Reaction
The dominance of the culturalist perspective has also impacted strate-
gies aimed at combating terrorism. Community leaders, for instance, 
have galvanized measures regulating who should teach Islam and what 
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should be taught. Surveillance of religious teachers has been institution-
alized. One measure that has received much attention in the popular 
media is the Asatizah Recognition Scheme established by the Muslim 
Religious Council (MUIS) that seeks to prevent the propagation of 
deviant teachings by ofﬁcially recognizing a selected pool of religious 
teachers for that purpose (Straits Times 10 June 2007: 2-3). The perspec-
tive has also resulted in the battle for the correct interpretations of Islam 
amongst Muslims themselves. They rhetorically call for Islam to be 'put 
in the right perspective', 'to adjust their [the Muslims'] approach, taking 
into account changing environment and circumstances', 'to strive for 
peace not animosity with mankind', to 'focus more on substance rather 
than form in religious practices' (Business Times 3 August 2002: 1-2), 'to 
be moderate in outlook, conscious of the situation around them and 
respond accordingly' (Straits Times 17 December 2001), to articulate an 
Islam relevant for Singapore, and one that is not inconsistent with being 
a loyal Singapore citizen (Berita Harian 8 August 2002).    
The focus has also enhanced the role of a group of theologians who 
are inevitably constrained by the language of theology in analyzing ter-
rorism. The rise to prominence of the Religious Rehabilitation Group, 
or RRG, formed in 2003, illustrates this point.  Self-initiated by a few 
members of the religious elite, the efforts of the group in counseling JI 
detainees have been applauded by the government that sees itself in no 
position to counter misguided religious ideas (Straits Times 18 October 
2005: H3; 19 February 2006: 7; 21 August 2006: H7). Also reaching out 
to educate students and youths, the RRG takes the line that terrorism is 
caused by the erroneous interpretation of Islam. Given this presumption, 
the group has focused on explaining the theological meanings of Jihad, 
(struggle), Al Wala Wal Bara (love and hatred), Darul Islamiyah (Islamic 
state), Baiah (oath of loyalty) and Istimata (seeking death through sui-
cide), all of which seek to establish that Islam does not contribute to 
violence (Straits Times 3 February 2007: 8-9).22 
Moderate Muslims and the Issue of Identity  
A more serious repercussion is the rise of groups positioning themselves 
as guardians of Islam within the community. Although they speak for 
moderation, their views on speciﬁc issues are problematic, such as 
the necessity of a collective voice on matters pertaining to Islam. This 
view, which in effect means that only the self proclaimed guardians 
can speak for Islam, reﬂects their level of tolerance for diversity. They 
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have also asserted that Islam is a comprehensive religion that governs 
all aspects of life including law, government and politics, but the po-
litical emasculation of Muslim minorities justiﬁes the exemption of the 
full implementation of Islamic systems and Islamic law (minority ﬁkh). 
Implicit in these writings is a style of thought that is based on a binary 
in principles between secular and Islamic systems. In principle they 
uphold the Islamic law on punishment (hudud) as a religious obligation, 
without discussing in detail what it entails, while maintaining that their 
minority status excludes them from implementing it. Similarly while 
they delve into tenth-century theological discourse on the legitimacy of 
territory of existence and the rights and obligations of minority Mus-
lims in this context, they acknowledge at the end of the day that it is 
not incompatible in Islam for Muslims to work and live in Singapore.23 
Amongst them are sympathizers of political Islam who emphasize the 
need to contextualize theology to suit conditions where Muslims con-
stitute a minority (Muhammed 2005).    
Although they do not promote political activism that challenges the 
state, their thinking can create unwarranted problems bearing on inte-
gration. When state systems and institutions are constantly perceived as 
distinct from Islamic ones, polarities and ambivalence can result in the 
minds of ordinary Muslims. Rather than facilitate integration and par-
take as active citizens in the development of these national institutions, 
the result may well create or intensify doubts and condition exclusivist 
orientations and marginalization. Furthermore, such rhetoric is indeed 
alien to Malay/Muslim religious discourse in Singapore. Its undiscern-
ing importation brings along with it concerns that are insigniﬁcant to 
Singaporean Muslims and drags the community into discussing issues 
irrelevant to them. 
Another major reaction conditioned by the culturalist perspective in the 
context of post 9/11 is the Singapore Muslim identity project embarked 
upon by the Muslim Religious Council of Singapore, which has culmi-
nated in a charter explicating the Singaporean Muslim identity.24 The 
charter aims to promote a community of excellence and progress based 
on the values of Islam. Here again, Islam is the focus as religious ofﬁcials 
galvanize support from the community for the formalization of ten at-
tributes that the Council deems integral to Singaporean Muslim identity.25 
These attributes, however, are well established in the basic teachings of 
Islam. The main challenge that has received much less attention is how 
these are reﬂected in Singaporean Muslims' religious institutions.  
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Development of Research
In effect, the dominance of the culturalist approach, which makes Islam 
the issue, blocks systematic and intellectually informed investigations 
based on the contributions of social science perspectives, concepts and 
methodology vital for a more comprehensive understanding of ter-
rorism, which has been eloquently pointed out by Said (1994: 341-59). 
The problem is also reﬂected in Sidel's forceful critique  (2008) against 
intellectual productions on the 'Islamist threat' in Southeast Asia. Of 
pertinence is his observation of the 'excessive narrowness in sources', 
dearth of critical discussion and the lack of the 'realm of explanation' that 
are found in the all-too-ready conclusions accounting for violence in the 
name of Islam. Much of these, he maintained, are based on sources that 
identify the bad guys and provide detailed accounts of their ideological 
inﬂuences using theological and other languages. Sidel demonstrated 
how this approach conditions not only the selection of problems but their 
level of abstraction resulting in pertinent gaps that limit understanding 
of the phenomenon (Sidel 2008).
Such works are part of the alternative discourse beyond theology 
in explaining terrorism, generally absent in ofﬁcial discourse. They 
are grounded in an analysis of history and the politics of alignment 
of speciﬁc political groups amidst the reconﬁguration of political and 
economic power across societies. Mamdani (2005), for instance, locates 
'Islamic' terrorism in the context of a political encounter in the late cold 
war dating from the American defeat in Vietnam. He demonstrated how 
America's ideology during the cold war justiﬁed alliances with Islam-
ists in the battle against Soviet power in Afghanistan, which became a 
global jihad, and explained how it turned against America when the 
terms of the pact were not fulﬁlled. Though this political project har-
nessed aspects of Muslim tradition or culture, Mamdani asserts that it 
is a modern political movement at the service of a modern power and 
not a cultural afﬂiction. Similarly, Roy's study concluded that radicalism 
'is a political decision, formulated (after the decision to use lethal action 
has been made) in religious terms, which could even be considered bid'a 
or innovation.... There is no systematic link between a radical political 
position and theological thinking' (Roy 2004: 257). 
 Sageman's ﬁndings (2008), based on proﬁling the third wave of ter-
rorists involved in the bombings in London and Spain, further caution 
reliance on the culturalist perspective.26  It undermines the view that the 
phenomenon is predominantly intertwined with Muslim religious insti-
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tutions or theological interpretations of Islam. He found that many were 
second generation marginalized migrants from secular, middle-class 
households who do not adhere to austere tenets of Islam, nor are they the 
product of poverty, ignorance, religious brainwashing or recruits from 
terrorist camps. They were in fact home-grown, self-recruited, young 
wannabees, seeking thrills and a sense of signiﬁcance and belonging in 
their lives and connected through the internet. Some, such as those in-
volved in the Madrid bombings, are running one of the most successful 
drug networks there. Sageman cautions that the explanation for their 
behaviour lies not in how they think but rather in how they feel, com-
pounded by the moral outrage over the invasion of Iraq that he sees as 
fanning the violent orientation among these perpetrators in cyberspace. 
Further support is provided by(Abou Zahab and Roy's study (2004) on 
Islamist networks in Pakistan and Afghanistan, which revealed that 
these groups had little relation to avowed religious ideology although 
all purportedly give priority to the ummah above ethnic or nationalistic 
identities. The authors also explained shifts in ideology within these 
groups, which recourse to the culturalist mode cannot explain.27 Such 
works dispel the 'ummist' perspective that makes Islam the issue. They 
provide insights into the complex diversity of radical groups in terms of 
their ideological beliefs, orientations and mode of operation and account 
for factors that condition radical shifts in ideologies within them.
That Islam is the issue is also challenged by recent ﬁndings based 
on the largest ever survey of Muslim opinion worldwide conducted 
by the Gallup Center for Muslim Studies. 28 The survey, carried out in 
40 predominantly Muslim countries involving more than 50,000 inter-
views, revealed that radicals—deﬁned as those who condone extremist 
acts like the September 11 attacks—form just about seven percent of 
the Muslim respondents worldwide. The most signiﬁcant ﬁnding was 
that none within this group gave religious justiﬁcation for their beliefs. 
Instead, their response was that the US 'deserved' the hit for reasons 
that were political. The overwhelming majority condemned the attacks 
because innocent lives were lost and civilians killed, with some saying 
their religion forbade such attacks. In most Muslim-majority countries, 
an overwhelming number of Muslims did not support extremism while 
saying that religion was a very important part of their lives—99 percent in 
Indonesia, 98 percent in Egypt, 98 percent in Saudi Arabia and 95 percent 
in Pakistan.29 The survey concluded that politics, not piety is the diving 
line between those who advocate violence and those who don't.
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Implications for Social Cohesion
Such alternative sources and perspectives are crucial to providing a 
more informed understanding of the problem that cannot be overlooked 
in seeking remedies to eradicate the threat of terrorism and avoid po-
tential negative backlash on social cohesion. As long as the problem of 
terrorism is perceived as closely rooted in theological interpretations of 
Islam, which the Muslim community must resolve, little can be done to 
bridge understanding. Furthermore, it reinforces the danger of groups 
with vested interests who will misuse Islam to create insecurities and 
friction, undermining social cohesion.  This will intensify the very con-
cern of the government encapsulated in Goh's statement:
 Our greater worry is the threat to our security, and to our racial and religious 
harmony following the discovery of terrorist activities in our country. … 
Should a terrorist threat in Singapore by some extreme group ever succeed, it 
would do untold harm. Not only would it cause the loss of life and property, 
but far worse, it would also result in profound misunderstanding and distrust 
between the different communities.30
Muslims themselves have expressed unease over the focus on Islam 
and their religiosity. They maintain that it has created an unwarranted 
image of the community and questioned whether this was necessary 
when terrorist attacks involved a handful of extremists. This has neces-
sitated Malay political leaders to urge Muslims not to jump to conclu-
sions about the intentions of non-Muslim political leaders (Straits Times 
10 June 2002: 6).
The government has repeatedly stressed the need for social cohesion, 
not merely as a counter to terrorism's backlash on the Muslims, but also 
to eradicate it (Singapore Ministry of Home Affairs 2003: 23). It urged 
the Chinese not to distrust or discriminate against the Muslims because 
of the acts of few extremists while Muslims are told not to harbour 
suspicions against non-Muslims. It has also introduced various strate-
gies towards fostering harmony and trust including the establishment 
of Inter Racial Conﬁdence Circles (IRCC) and the Code of Religious 
Values, which aim to widen networks and deepen linkages between 
ethnic groups. In addition, civic groups have called for the creation of 
alternative, ethnically neutral platforms to strengthen understanding 
and trust as a counter to existing community-based self-help groups 
that are believed to reinforce differences and exclusiveness.31 
Without doubt, all these efforts are inspired by a commitment to so-
cial cohesion. However, there are already sufﬁcient major institutions 
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that embody values of social justice and equality in the domains of 
religion, education, politics and government, law and culture, and the 
arts within Singaporean multiracial society conditioned by the social 
philosophy of elites in these domains. One cannot agree more with 
Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, who maintained that by continuing to 
uphold the ideals of meritocracy and equal opportunity and treatment 
regardless of race, language and religion, we can build conﬁdence and 
trust between the different communities and that building trust takes 
time and requires frequent interaction between leaders and members 
of the public of different ethnic and religious groups (Straits Times 10 
February 2006: H9). 
This positive ideal of cohesion will, however, be marred as long as 
the culturalist perspective remains dominant. It hampers awareness of 
our common destiny and humanity. Community leaders have asserted 
with certainty that if a bomb went off in Singapore and if radicalized 
Muslim Singaporeans were found to be responsible, distrust and hate 
crimes between the races would result. This reveals how deeply the 
culturalist perspective has conditioned the understanding of terrorism 
as intertwined with Islam (Straits Times 17 December 2005: H7). Gov-
ernment leaders' speeches revealing that after 9/11 some non-Muslims 
feared entering the same lift with Muslims and that Chinese companies 
may refuse to employ them are further evidence of the deep distrust 
and insecurity harboured by some.32
The danger of the culturalist approach is that it can be abused by 
those who succumb to irrationalism, prejudice, malice and hatred for 
the other.  It may also reinforce tribalism, parochialism and bigotry, all 
of which are traits of negative orientations that undermine the well-
being of plural societies as they thwart the need to think in terms of 
humanistic values and our common humanity.33  The major challenge 
lies in upholding and strengthening progressive and inclusive orienta-
tions within existing institutions to defend against the threat of terrorism 
and safeguard social cohesion. In this struggle there is no place for the 
culturalist perspective.      
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NOTES
1  Goh, Chok Tong. Speech at the Dialogue Session with Union Leaders/Members 
and Employees, Singapore, 14 October 2001. Available from: http://stars.nhb.gov.
sg/stars/public/ (accessed 5 May 2009). 
2  Lee, Kuan Yew. Speech at the First International Institute for Strategic Studies Asia 
Security Conference, Shangrila Hotel, Singapore, 31 May 2002. Available from: 
http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/ (accessed 5 May 2009). 
3  Goh, Chok Tong. Speech at the National Day Rally, Singapore, 18 August 2002. 
Available from: http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/ (accessed 5 May 2009).  
4  Lee, Kuan Yew. Speech at the First International Institute for Strategic Studies Asia 
Security Conference, op. cit.
5  Roy’s discussion on deﬁning a cultural community is relevant (Roy 1999: 56-65). 
See also Said’s critique of according Islam overriding signiﬁcance in understanding 
Muslims (Said 1997: xv-xlviii). 
6  Roy (2004) maintains that even then, few involve Islam, even if reference is made 
to it in the aftermath in ideological terms.     
7  See for instance, Lewis (1990). On discussions by local scholars on the issue, refer 
to Tan (2002) and Desker (2003).   
8  For a discussion on Dutch policy on Islam, refer to Benda (1958: 9-31).  
9  For a discussion on the construction of the Chinese race, refer to Clammer (1998:164-
74). 
 10   Singapore's position within the region prompted the PAP to liken it to an 'independ-
ent Israel in Southeast Asia' in its rationale for merger and inﬂuenced the establish-
ment of an alliance with the US as the strong defense partner, based on the Israeli 
experience (Chan 1971: 11).  
11  Lee, Kuan Yew. 'Loyalty and the SAF'. Speech at Dialogue Session with AMP and 
Majlis Pusat, Parliament House Auditorium, Singapore, 3 March 2001. Available 
from:  http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/ (accessed 5 May 2009). 
12  Goh, Chok Tong. 'Beyond Madrid: Winning Against Terrorism'. Speech to Council 
on Foreign Relations, Washington DC, 6 May 2004. Available from:  http://stars.
nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/ (accessed 5 May 2009). 
13 Goh, Chok Tong. Speech at the Dialogue Session with Union Leaders/Members 
and Employees, Nanyang Polytecnic, Singapore, 14 October 2001. Available from: 
http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/ (accessed 6 May 2009). 
14  Goh, Chok Tong. 'Beyond Madrid: Winning Against Terrorism', op. cit.
15 Goh, Chok Tong, 'Beyond Madrid: Winning Against Terrorism', op cit. For details 
on the RAND report,  refer to Rabasa (2004).  
16  Goh, Chok Tong. 'National Day Rally Address'. University Cultural Center, NUS, 
Singapore, 18 August 2002. Available from: http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/ 
(accessed 6 May 2009). 
17  Lee, Kuan Yew. Speech at the First International Institute for Strategic Studies Asia 
Security Conference, op. cit.
18  Goh, Chok Tong. 'Beyond Madrid: Winning Against Terrorism', op. cit. 
19  For a brief account of the proﬁle of these terrorists, see Roy (2004: 51-52) and Kurz-
man (2002: 1-2).  
20  Goh, Chok Tong. 'Beyond Madrid: Winning Against Terrorism', op. cit.
21  Brown perceives this as part of the 'corporatist' model in the management of race in 
Singapore's politics. 
22  See also Muhammad Haniff Hassan and Mohamed bin Ali (2007).
23  These views are contained in the work of PERGAS (2004).   
126 ___________________ The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 27(2)•2009
Noor Aisha Abdul Rahman __________________________________________________
24  The Straits Times (7 May 2003: 12,13) provides a report of the context and rationale 
underlying the articulation of the Singapore Muslim Identity.  
25  The ten attributes are identiﬁed and discussed in Muslim Religious Council of Sin-
gapore (2006).      
26  For a more detailed account of the proﬁle and group dynamics based on 400 biog-
raphies from trial records in New York in 2001, refer to Sageman (2004).   
27  For a discussion on shifts in ideological and religious alignment of Islamist groups in Pa-
kistan and the role of ethnicity often overlooked, refer to Abou Zahab and Roy (2004). 
28  Available from: http://cmes.hmdc.harvard.edu/ﬁles/ModerateExtreme_Flyer_
POLL_01.08.pdf (accessed February 2009).
29  Ibid.
30  Goh, Chok Tong. 'Prime Minister's New Year Message 2002'. Available from:  http://
stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/ (accessed 6 May 2009). 
31  See Gillian Koh (2006).  Refer also to the Centre of Excellence for National Security 
(CENS) (2006). 
32 Goh, Chok Tong. Opening Remarks at Dialogue with Community Leaders on Impact 
of Arrest of JI Operatives, Kallang Theatre, Singapore, 28 January 2002. Available 
from:  http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/ (accessed 6 May 2009). 
33 Shaharuddin’s (1980) discussion on the traits of the backward mind in religious 
experience and its impact on the well-being of plural society is highly useful in this 
context. Though his insights deal with negative religious orientations, his critique 
may well extend to orientations that are not based on religious beliefs. 
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